By Thom Shanker / The New York Times

The new American commander in Afghanistan has ordered a 60-day review of the entire military mission to identify better ways to separate the population from insurgents, an assessment that is expected to lead to new economic and military steps to carve fighters off from the Taliban.

“The measure of effectiveness will not be enemy killed,” General McChrystal told a Senate committee at his confirmation hearing on June 2. “It will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence.”

The comment was viewed as particularly significant coming from General McChrystal, who was trained in “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency theory as a young Green Beret but more recently spent five years commanding the most secret capture-or-kill teams in Iraq and Afghanistan.

General McChrystal took command this week, as the American military starts to double its number of personnel members in Afghanistan, to about 68,000 by late summer.

More than a dozen senior military officers and Pentagon civilians involved in the review described the effort to refocus military planning, tactics and operations, but spoke on the condition of anonymity because the assessment was just getting under way.

Military planners predict that the increased troop presence will allow the military to raise the stakes on insurgent “day fighters” who pick up arms less for ideology than for money to survive. Until now, they could join the insurgency ad hoc and at relatively little risk of being captured, wounded or killed.

“We are going to bring the hurt to the insurgency and offer them an existential choice,” said another senior military officer.

“Those who are ideologically committed — we don’t expect them to change. They will fight, and they will die,” the officer said. “But for the many for whom ideology is not the motivation, we are going to offer them a serious motivation to stop, to make another choice.”

The key, of course, is creating other employment. Senior advisers to General McChrystal acknowledge that the increase in troop levels must be complemented by more civilian support for the Afghan government as it struggles to deliver economic opportunities, education, health care and a rule of law.

One key will be increasing the size and professionalism of Afghanistan’s security forces. Another will be assuring that farmers who agree to cultivate legitimate crops will be protected from intimidation by narcotics bosses, whose proceeds form a main base of financial support to the insurgency.

The military says it will also seek to form a social contract with farmers and small business leaders: If they choose legitimate crops and pay taxes, they will be guaranteed secure transportation routes to markets without the pressure of bribes at illegal checkpoints.

The impact of the economy on the insurgency is significant, officials said. Even a primitive economy that is self-sustaining will reduce the number of unemployed men who join the insurgency for day wages.

A major task will be gaining people’s trust in government. Many Afghans, with their history of powerful regional warlords, remain unconvinced of the legitimacy — or staying power — of the central government and its American sponsors.

“Unless and until the government can be seen to rise above corruption, it will never find acceptance among the people,” said one senior military officer.

Commanders want to measure whether increased security — and, with it, increased economic vitality — can generate more support for the government. In preparation for the troop increase, the military conducted a series of public opinion polls to gauge how Afghans view their government and the quality of their lives.

Even with the increase in American forces, senior advisers to General McChrystal warned that the military still did not have sufficient troops to do all it wanted. This will prompt commanders to focus on population centers and, in the first months of the troop increase, even surrender the fight in isolated and unpopulated valleys that provide a haven for insurgents.